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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURES-SANCTIONS AVAILABLE 
To ENFORCE PRE-TRIAL ORDERS-Petitioner, plaintiff in an action in federal 
district court, was ordered under Federal Rule 161 to submit pre-trial state-
ments setting out the facts of the case, his damages, his witnesses and 
exhibits, and his legal theories of recovery. His counsel filed statements 
which were adjudged insufficient, and a pre-trial order was entered preclud-
ing petitioner from offering at trial any testimony by witnesses other than 
himself and his wife, or any evidence concerning liability in negligence 
or breach of warranty, and limiting his exhibits and evidence of damages. 
On petition for mandamus to set aside the preclusion order, held, granted, 
one judge dissenting in part. Since Rule 16 authorizes the issuance of an 
order setting forth only those points on which the parties have willingly 
reached agreement, the information requested could not be compelled, 
and the preclusion order exceeded the judge's authority.2 Padovani v. 
Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961). 
1 "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties 
to appear before it for a conference to consider (1) The simplification of the issues; 
• • • (3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will 
avoid unnecessary proof; (4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses; . • • 
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. 
"The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, 
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as 
to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not 
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered 
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent 
manifest injustice.'' Fm. R. Crv. P. 16. 
2 The court also held that the directions issued by the pre-trial judge were too in-
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Of the several devices which may be used to gather information between 
the pleading and trial stages in the federal courts, the pre-trial conference 
has gained perhaps the widest recognition3 and is regularly used, particu-
larly in protracted litigation.4 The purpose and function of the pre-trial 
hearing is to define and simplify the issues between the parties and to 
ascertain the facts which relate to these issues, in this way lessening the 
chance of surprise at the trial and the risk of judicial error.11 However, 
since neither this often-stated purpose nor rule 16 itself provides the pre-
trial judge with an adequate outline of his powers and duties the rule is 
sometimes misused6 in an attempt to clear up backlogs of docketed cases, 
or is used with less than its full effectiveness. The problem is to define, 
without over-restricting the judge's discretion, what information may be 
required of the parties, and what sanctions are available to insure com-
pliance. 7 
Some courts and writers advocate limiting the amount of information 
required from the parties at pre-trial to little more than a statement of 
the relevant facts.8 There is a fear among adherents of this policy that 
because trials seldom go as counsel expect,9 any more extensive requirement 
would be likely to abridge the rights of the parties at trial.10 They insist 
definite, and in this the dissenting judge concurred. The dissent found fault with alleged 
indications in the majority decision that a court may not issue a preclusion order upon 
failure of a party to comply with directions, and that the facts in issue and legal theo-
ries relied upon may not be ascertained prior to trial. 
3 See, e.g., 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 16.06 (2d ed. 1948) • 
4 For an indication of the problems peculiar to protracted litigation and suggested 
pre-trial procedures for this class of cases, see ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 25 (1955) (proposed amendment to rule 
16) ; McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. 
L. REv. 27 (1950); Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1959); 
Report: Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953). 
5 Cherney v. Holmes, 185 F.2d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1950) ; American Oil Co. v. 
Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 682 (D.Rl. 1959) ; Laws, Plan for 
Pre-Trial Procedure Under New Rules in District of Columbia, 25 A.B.A.J. 855 (1939); 
Success of Pretrial Hearing Demonstrated, 21 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 160 (1938). 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (6), supra note 1, is sometimes taken as a license to force a settle-
ment. 
7 Contrary to the indication of the court in the principal case, the pre-trial judge 
has the power to compel certain admissions from the parties. The use of rule 16 is 
discretionary, but to say that a court, having decided upon pre-trial proceedings, cannot 
compel the parties to follow the directives of a pre-trial judge would render the rule 
nugatory. The courts' complete acceptance of the power of the pre-trial judge to invoke 
sanctions for failure to follow directives is based on the premise that the judge may 
compel the parties to participate in the proceedings. 
8 See, e.g., Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 48 (1957) • 
9 See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 87 (1949). 
10 See James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules, 71 HARv. 
L. REv. 1473, 1481 (1958). There has been some concern that, because of the finality 
ac_cord~d pre-tri~ ord~~s, facts o_r legal theories w_hlch take on importance only after pre-
tnal will be denied ainng at tnal. But courts will generally amend orders prior to trial 
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that pre-trial is merely a form of pleading and that, therefore, only the 
facts of the case should be considered-the responsibility being upon the 
trial court alone to determine relevant legal theories.11 This distrust of 
pre-trial proceedings has led a majority of courts to hold also that a party 
is not required to disclose his witnesses prior to trial lest he be damaged 
by his failure to anticipate witnesses he may want to call.12 If the pre-
trial is actually to expedite the trial of the case, however, mere statements 
of agreed facts seem inadequate to meet this objective, and other courts 
uphold the requirement of a full and complete disclosure of all legal and 
fact issues which the parties intend to raise at trial,13 with the exception 
of issues which may involve privileged or impeaching matter.14 Some 
courts, moreover, require the parties to list the names and addresses of 
their prospective witnesses. This would seem to be the better rule,115 since 
it would tend to narrow the areas of inquiry and argument with regard to 
those witnesses at trial. This would not only shorten trial time, but would 
increase the likelihood of a just outcome by reducing trial by battle of 
counsel, a major objective of the Federal Rules.16 
if motion is made to enter evidence not known at the time of pre-trial conference, and 
issues not indicated at pre-trial may even be entered at trial if necessary to prevent "mani-
fest injustice." See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 599 (1952) • 
11 The majority opinion in the principal case apparently takes this restricted view 
of pre-trial. 
12 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 11 26.19, at 1077-81 (2d ed. 1950) • 
18 However, it has been stated that if a pre-trial is to make a determination of all 
relevant issues without impinging on the rights of the parties at trial, these issues should 
be considered one by one, with the judge exploring both sides of each issue, determining 
both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's response before moving on. Quite often at 
pre-trial the defendant will attempt to postpone any disclosure of his own position 
until all of the details of the plaintiff's case have been revealed. This is not "limiting the 
issues," but actually approaches trial procedure, where the plaintiff must state a case be• 
fore the defendant goes forward, and, as stated in the principal case, almost inevitably 
leads to some "sacrifice of the court's natural position of strict neutrality among liti-
gants." McDowell, Pretrial Procedures; Pretrial v. Procedure, 4 ANTITRUsr Buu.. 675, 
681 (1959). 
In order that pre-trial actually assist the trial on the merits, results must be reached 
as quickly as possible. Yet in the principal case, proceedings preparatory to the con-
ference itself, in which plaintiff was required to submit lengthy written statements, took 
well over a year. Submission of memoranda by the parties prior to pre-trial conference 
has been found to be of great value, but when it becomes evident that such ancillary re-
quests are hindering rather than speeding the conference, the judge should abandon the 
inquiry or, in the case of an uncooperative counsel, invoke appropriate sanctions. 
14 Walker v. West Coast Fast Freight, Inc., 233 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1956); Bogatay 
v. Montour R.R., 177 F. Supp. 269, 270 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. 
Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 17 F.R.D. 52, 55 (D. Ore. 1954); Burton v. Weyerhaeuser 
Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571, 572 (D. Ore. 1941) ; 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, 1J 16.08. 
115 See 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 12, 11 26.19. Some provision should be made, how-
ever, to allow testimony by a bona fide after-acquired witness. 
16 See, e.g., In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1942) · and Laws Pre-Trial 
-Its P_urposes and J?otentiali~ies, 21 ?Eo. WASH. L. REv. I, 5 (1952), in which it is argued 
that without pre-trial there IS surpnse and confusion at trial, giving a great advantage 
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In order that the pre-trial conference be effective, the judge must have 
some means of enforcing his orders. There are three sanctions commonly 
used: the judge may enter a dismissal with prejudice which bars the 
offending party from the trial court and allows him only an appeal; he 
may preclude a party from offering specified evidence or legal theories at 
trial;17 or he may fine the offender. There has been uniform acceptance 
of the district courts' power to use the first two sanctions, but there is 
marked divergence as to the scope of their application. There are indica-
tions that the circuits which have limited the information required of the 
parties will also keep a tight rein on the discretion exercised by the pre-
trial judge, approving a preclusion order only when absolutely necessary 
to a just and efficient disposition of the case, and allowing a dismissal 
only when a party has shown an extraordinary disregard for the judge's 
authority.18 On the other hand, other circuits have been quite liberal in 
allowing the district courts to dismiss complaints and issue preclusion orders 
when pre-trial directives are not followed.19 No court, however, has as yet 
defined limits to guide the pre-trial judge in his determination of whether 
to issue a preclusion order or whether to enter a dismissal. The third 
sanction, the imposition of a fine, has been approved by some courts20 and 
legal writers,21 but has not often been used by pre-trial judges. Since the 
judge may fine either the party or counsel, this sanction has the obvious 
advantage of penalizing the disobedient party without detracting from 
his case at trial. It would seem that such a sanction should have been 
used in the principal case, and indeed, since so often counsel is at fault 
rather than the litigant himself, imposition of a fine would be effective and 
proper in most instances of non-compliance with pre-trial directions and 
would further achieve the Federal Rules' goal of shielding clients from 
the consequences of counsel's delinquencies. 
Allowing the pre-trial judge to demand a wide variety of information 
from the parties, with drastic sanctions available in case of non-compliance, 
is admittedly a grant of power which, if misused as in the principal case, 
to the party with the more proficient counsel, which should not exist in an "enlightened 
system of justice." 
17 This sanction, when carried to an extreme as in the principal case, may be just 
as destructive of the party's case as outright dismissal by allowing him to go to trial 
with such a paucity of admissible evidence that he has no possibility of obtaining judg-
ment. 
18 See, e.g., Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 
1959). 
19 The Seventh Circuit, for instance, upheld a dismissal entered when plaintiff's 
counsel failed to appear at a pre-trial hearing. Link v. Wabash R.R., 291 F.2d 542 (7th 
Cir. 1961). 
20 See Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 763, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1961) • 
21 See, e.g., LAws & STOCKMAN, PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCES 11 Gudicial .Administration 
Monographs, Series A, No. 4, 1941) . 
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can prejudice a party's case. Nevertheless, something more than the power 
to require the "unforced" statement of facts recommended in the principal 
case22 can be given without impairing the trial on the merits. A set of 
flexible rules should be formulated, perhaps by the Supreme Court in its 
supervisory capacity, which would both define the judge's duty and set 
a limit on his power under rule 16.23 The judge should probably be re-
quired in all cases to have the parties submit a statement of the facts to 
be relied upon at trial, and a list of prospective witnesses and exhibits. 
As a general limitation, the attorney work-product theory24 and foresee-
ability problems probably dictate that the judge should not be granted the 
power to require the parties to indicate which witnesses and exhibits are 
intended to establish particular facts, or the way in which established facts 
are intended to support particular legal theories. However, he should have 
a good deal of freedom to request intermediate information. Although the 
taking of actual testimony should be left to the trial court, the pre-trial 
judge might request the parties to indicate the general nature of the evi-
dence to be given by the witnesses listed. The listing would allow the 
adverse party to take depositions and inquire into the qualifications of 
expert witnesses; the indication of their connection with the case would 
be of value when a large number of witnesses was anticipated, and could 
be of use to the judge in limiting the number of expert witnesses.25 
Similarly, requiring the parties to list exhibits would further insure that 
each party will be forewarned as to what his adversary will proffer, and 
should the judge feel that furnishing copies at pre-trial would expedite the 
subsequent trial, he could request their submission, provided the request 
is reasonable.26 Such a request would be particularly appropriate in pro-
tracted litigation where there is usually a large amount of documentary 
material which could be condensed, made a part of the pre-trial order, and 
read directly into the trial record. In order to prevent a return to "code 
pleading," probably the judge should have no power to require the parties 
to list their legal theories. In the few cases in which it is not obvious that 
there is a legal theory to support a party's claim or defense, opposing 
counsel can force a declaration of the relevant theory by moving for sum-
mary judgment. 
There should also be guide lines to aid the judge in his selection of 
sanctions. The general requirement should be that the judge determine 
22 Principal case at 550. 
23 See also Christenson, When Is a Pre-Trial Conference a "Pre-Trial Conference"?, 
23 F.R.D. 129 (1959) listing thirteen points which the author believes are "minimum 
components" of an effective pre-trial conference. 
24 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (4). 
26 See Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 295 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1961), revers-
ing a pre-trial order for the production of an unreasonable number of exhibits. 
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whether counsel or the party himself is at fault, perhaps presuming that 
when the failure concerns the facts of the case the fault lies with the 
party, and that a delinquency in listing legal theories, if required, is attrib-
utable to counsel. Dismissal or preclusion should be ordered only when the 
fault lies with the party, and probably the dismissal order should be 
reserved for failures to list facts sufficient to support the claim. Obviously 
these restrictions on pre-trial orders and sanctions will deprive the pre-trial 
judge of some of his discretion. Nevertheless, setting up a framework of 
powers and duties within which the pre-trial judge should function would 
help to ensure more speedy, just and efficient disposition of civil suits in 
the federal courts. 
John M. Price 
